{"id":61954,"date":"2024-07-17T18:58:28","date_gmt":"2024-07-18T01:58:28","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.todayifoundout.com\/?p=61954"},"modified":"2024-07-17T18:58:28","modified_gmt":"2024-07-18T01:58:28","slug":"a-failed-attack-what-happened-to-the-ships-at-pearl-harbor","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.todayifoundout.com\/index.php\/2024\/07\/a-failed-attack-what-happened-to-the-ships-at-pearl-harbor\/","title":{"rendered":"A Failed Attack- What Happened to the Ships at Pearl Harbor?"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"\"<\/a>\u201cYesterday, December 7, 1941 – a date which will live in infamy – the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by the naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan.\u201d<\/i><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

This speech, delivered to Congress by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, is one of the most famous of the 20th century, and marked the official entrance of the United States into the Second World War. That conflict would end four years later in total Allied victory – though at the cost of some 85 million lives – nearly 3% of the world\u2019s population. Today, the attack on Pearl Harbour is seared into the American consciousness alongside other national traumas like 9\/11, and each year millions of tourists travel to Hawaii to visit the rusting, oil-weeping wreck of the <\/span><\/span><\/span>USS Arizona. <\/i><\/span><\/span><\/span>But while the general events of that day are familiar to many, what is less familiar is what exactly provoked Japan to do this, did Japan actually accomplish anything significant in the attack, and, on that note, what happened to each of the ships <\/span><\/span><\/span>after?<\/span><\/p>\n

As for the attack itself, this was the <\/span>brainchild of Japanese Admiral Isoruku Yamamoto, who began planning the operation in June of 1941. A rather curious move for Japan to <\/span><\/span><\/span>\u201cwake the sleeping giant\u201d as it were, it turns out the Japanese had little choice given their expansion goals and thanks in large part to previous moves by the United States to try to counter these.<\/span><\/p>\n

Going back a bit, the Japanese aggression into the likes of China and French Indochina and the atrocities the Japanese committed in those regions, see our 2 hour documentary Swept Under the Rug: The Truth About the Japanese Holocaust, had seen the U.S., despite supposedly not wanting to be involved in foreign matters, nonetheless spearhead a series of progressively more harsh embargoes on Japan, ultimately cutting Japan off from needed supplies of oil, iron, rubber, steel, etc. For reference here at the time, 94% of Japan\u2019s oil supplies were imported, and about 80% of that coming from the United States. After the embargo, it was noted by officials within the Imperial Japanese Navy that at that point they had perhaps as little as 6 months of campaigning before their ships would be dead in the water from lack of needed fuel. At that point forcing Japan to concede to whatever demands the U.S. wanted to place on them to lift the embargo.<\/span><\/p>\n

They, thus, had three choices. First, negotiate a treaty with the U.S. to get them to lift the embargo. Second, try a second attack after their previous failed against the Soviets to capture those regions to get the resources they needed (and in this one support their ally in Germany). Or, third, attack South, but into certain regions that were more or less protected by the U.S., and thus in their view would likely see the U.S. declare war on them as a result.<\/span><\/p>\n

As for option #1 of negotiating a treaty with the U.S. to resolve this, they actually tried exceptionally hard at this leading all the way up to mere hours before attacking Pearl Harbor. However, no such deal could be reached. That said, they did get pretty far along here, with Japan noting they would agree to withdraw from French Indochina and not attack any regions of Southeast Asia, so long as all aid to China was lifted from Britain, the U.S., and the Netherlands, and sanctions against Japan were likewise lifted. In essence, Japan was willing to give up most of their expansion plans and territories, but wanted to keep what they had captured of China and make war efforts there a little easier for themselves. The U.S., however, rejected this proposal, requiring all Japan had offered, plus also that Japan would withdraw from China and sign non-aggression pacts with the various Pacific states. Essentially, the U.S. stating, \u201cRetreat back into your own country and abandon all plans of a true Japanese Empire and self sufficiency, as well as abandon plans to liberate Asia from Western influence like ourselves.\u201d In so doing, this would also once again make Japan subservient to the U.S. and other nations because of the needed industrial supplies from them that Japan had no other access to.<\/span><\/p>\n

As you can imagine, given the U.S. wasn\u2019t really conceding literally anything, this was a non-starter for the Japanese leaders. Something that it seems is exactly what the U.S. officials were hoping for- to provoke Japan into conflict and thus, hopefully allow the U.S. to enter the war against Japan\u2019s supposed but not really ally in Germany.<\/span><\/p>\n

As for option #2 of attacking North against the Soviets, again, this was deemed too risky given they had no real way to counter the Soviet tanks and, as mentioned, had been defeated so resoundingly there on this front in their previous attempt.<\/span><\/p>\n

This left option #3: before their oil and other supplies ran out, expand south into the Dutch East Indies, British Malaya, the Philippeans, and elsewhere to acquire the resources they needed while also accomplishing the goal of beginning to establish the Japanese Empire and liberating these regions from Western influence.<\/span><\/p>\n

The problem here, again, was that to do so, they were convinced would cause the U.S. to declare war on them, with Japan then in a rather precarious position of not yet being fortified in the regions they were planning on taking right when the U.S.\u2019s Pacific Fleet would presumably quickly attack.<\/span><\/p>\n

Or, at least, they assumed they would. As you might expect given wide support for isolationism at the time in the U.S., historians debate whether the U.S. actually would have or not had Japan just gone ahead and done it without attacking the U.S. directly.<\/span><\/p>\n

On all this, President Roosevelt explicitly stated the U.S. would not have\u2026 except he also believed that over the course of their activities in the region, the Japanese would make a mistake that he could leverage to drag the U.S. into war with Japan, and then his real goal- war with Germany. As noted by Pacific Fleet Admiral James O. Richardson when he asked Roosevelt if the U.S. would be going to war with Japan. He states Roosevelt responded, \u201cif the Japanese attacked Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula, or the Dutch East Indies we would not enter the war, that if they even attacked the Philippines (note here, the Philippines at the time were an American protectorate) he doubted whether we would enter the war, but that [the Japanese] could not always avoid making mistakes and that as the war continued and that area of operations expanded sooner or later they would make a mistake and we would enter the war.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Thus, if true, had the Japanese just went ahead and pushed south without directly involving the U.S., this is yet another point in WWII, much like when the Germans didn\u2019t let the Soviets join the Tripartite Pact when the Soviets made overtures that they wanted to join up, where things may have gone extremely differently both in the war in Europe and the Pacific had one decision been different.<\/span><\/p>\n

But, rightly or wrongly, the Japanese were convinced the U.S. would declare war on them the second they attacked the Philippines and other nations in the region. Something they had to do before they ran out of oil and other supplies because of U.S. embargoes against Japan.<\/span><\/p>\n

So what to do about it, especially when they knew they couldn\u2019t win a war against the United States?<\/span><\/p>\n

How about sink the Pacific Fleet in a surprise attack, thus temporarily crippling the U.S.\u2019 ability to retaliate while Japan simultaneously performed their own little Blitzkrieg, taking every nation they needed for the supplies and self sufficiency they wanted. They then would dig themselves in, such that it would require a massive effort by the United State to get them out. Something they knew the U.S. could do, but Japanese leaders felt that the U.S. would have no interest in such an effort given their general aversion to conflicts so far away. At that point, now from a much stronger negotiating position, and dealing with a nation that wouldn\u2019t really want to continue the war, the Japanese could simply negotiate a truce with the United States that favored Japanese interests.<\/span><\/p>\n

It\u2019s fool-proof!!!!<\/span><\/p>\n

Except not\u2026 Perhaps not adequately understanding American culture, and the classic modern day \u201cThese colors don\u2019t run\u201d type attitudes, while they had hoped the attack at Pearl Harbor would drive the U.S. citizens to even more advocate for isolating and withdrawing from these conflicts so far away, in reality their attack had more or less completely gotten rid of the American apathy towards the wars happening in the world at the time, undoing the isolationism that the U.S. had embraced post WWI. On top of this, because of the attack, which was perceived publicly as unprovoked even though the reality was Roosevelt and co. had been doing everything in their power to provoke Japan, the U.S. populace now had zero interest in negotiating a treaty with Japan. The American people wanted those deaths and the supposed unprovoked attack avenged, and weren\u2019t going to stop until Japan was crushed.<\/span><\/p>\n

Not all of the Japanese military leaders had been so deluded, however. For example, the aforementioned Marshal Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, in charge of the entire combined Japanese fleet, was not shy about his opposition to the original Japanese signing of the Tripartite Pact because of it not so subtly being directed at the United States. He stated of this on October 14, 1940, \u201cTo fight the United States is like fighting the whole world. But it has been decided. So I will fight the best I can. Doubtless I shall die on board Nagato. Meanwhile, Tokyo will be burnt to the ground three times. Konoe and others will be torn to pieces by the revengeful people\u2026.\u201d He also would state after the fact, \u201cUnlike the pre-Tripartite days, great determination is required to make certain that we avoid the danger of going to war.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

He further stated, seemingly understanding his potential enemy in a way other leaders in Japan did not, \u201cShould hostilities once break out between Japan and the United States, it would not be enough that we take Guam and the Philippines, nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. To make victory certain, we would have to march into Washington and dictate the terms of peace in the White House. I wonder if our politicians [who speak so lightly of a Japanese-American war] have confidence as to the final outcome and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Unfortunately for him, he wasn\u2019t listened to, and was even in charge of the attack on Pearl Harbor that would bring about the result he feared.<\/span><\/p>\n

And if you\u2019re wondering here, he was not killed aboard his flagship as he predicted, but rather when the U.S. intercepted an encrypted transmission outlining Yamamoto\u2019s plans to tour around the South Pacific inspecting his forces, and were thus able to shoot down his plane. Perhaps not such a bad death for a man who stated, \u201cTo die for Emperor and Nation is the highest hope of a military man. After a brave hard fight the blossoms are scattered on the fighting field\u2026 One man’s life or death is a matter of no importance. All that matters is the Empire. As Confucius said, “They may crush cinnabar, yet they do not take away its color; one may burn a fragrant herb, yet it will not destroy the scent.” They may destroy my body, yet they will not take away my will.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

In the end, thanks to Pearl Harbor, a drawn out war with the U.S., something the Japanese military brass had known they\u2019d lose quite handily if it happened, is exactly what happened. And while nobody in Japan could have anticipated the end result of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, the overall outcome was inevitable from the start given the U.S. had no interest in a treaty.<\/span><\/p>\n

But going back to the start of it all, w<\/span>hile the Japanese were confident they could defeat the outnumbered and poorly-equipped colonial forces of Britain and the Netherlands, the U.S. Pacific Fleet posed a more formidable threat. And <\/span><\/span><\/span>a<\/span>s allu<\/span><\/span><\/span>ded to, c<\/span>ontrary to popular belief, the Pearl Harbour attack was never intended to permanently destroy the American Fleet but rather temporarily disable it, buying Japan enough time to win a short campaign of conquest, consolidate its gains, achieve its needed resource independency, <\/span><\/span><\/span>eliminate<\/span> Western influence in these regions, and finally negotiate peace from a<\/span><\/span><\/span> stronger position.<\/span><\/p>\n

As the home anchorage of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor, on the Hawaiian island of Oahu, was home to a large number of ships, with over 100 commissioned and auxiliary vessels being in or just outside the harbour on the morning of December 7, 1941. Most of the large capital ships – the main target of the Japanese attack – were berthed along the east shore of Ford Island in what was known as <\/span><\/span><\/span>Battleship Row. <\/i><\/span><\/span><\/span>These were the:<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n